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FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND THREATS OF INDUSTRIAL ACTION BY
UNIONS OF MARITIME WORKERS
Viking Line ABP v International Transport Workers' Federation and Finnish Seamen's Union
[2005] EWHC 1222 (Comm) English Commercial Court
Jason Chuah
The facts
Readers are likely to know that Viking Line ABP, one of the larger passenger shipping companies in
the world, is a company incorporated and registered in Finland. The present case involves one of
Viking's less profitable lines ^ the Helsinki-Talinn route. The vessel in question is the Rosella which
was originally registered under the Finnish flag.Viking had applied to reflag the Rosella under the
Estonian flag as its principal competitors on the route man their vessels with Estonian crews, which
are significantly cheaper than Finnish crews. The company's position was that the reflagging would
entitle them to crew the shipwith Estonian seamenwhichwould result in considerable savings.
The trade unions (the Finnish Seamen's Union and the International TransportWorkers' Federation)
were resolved to take industrial action in protest.Viking thus applied for various declarations and
injunctions in anticipation of strike action by the FSU, and action by the ITF requiring ITF affiliates in
other jurisdictions, whichViking vessels visit, to participate in concertedboycott and other industrial
action against the Rosella and other Viking vessels. ITF argued that the English court lacked
substantive jurisdiction to make such orders.
Viking contended that any such action by the FSU and the ITF would be contrary:
(a) to Article 43 of theTreaty establishing the European Community (EC), (the principle of the
freedom of establishment);
(b) to Article 39 EC, (the principle of the freemovement of workers); or
(c) Article 1 of Council Regulation 4055/86/EEC, (applying the principle of freedom to provide
services to maritime transport between Member States and between Member States and third
countries.
The decision
The first issue the court had to address was whether, despite the fact that under Article 2 of the
Brussels Regulation 44/2001it had jurisdiction because the defendant, ITF, was domiciled in the UK,
it should, for reasons of judicial comity, not permit the application to proceed because it would
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involve, inter alia, a judgment as towhat Finnish law was and an assessmentof whether Finnish law
was compatible with EU law. However, the court stressed that following the ECJ's ruling in Case
C^281/02 Andrew Owusu v N B Jackson trading as `Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas' & Others,1 the court
cannot take into account the doctrine of forum non conveniens to decline jurisdiction even though
the facts might point to another jurisdiction as having a closer connection with the dispute. As long
as under the Regulation, the court of one Member State is seisedbecause the defendant is domiciled
in that Member State, all other Member States must decline jurisdiction and the Member State
concerned should not refuse jurisdiction (unless permitted by the Regulation to do so ^ such as
where the proceedings were in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, or that proceedings have
in fact been commenced earlier in another Member State in accordancewith the Regulation).
It was argued that the English court should decline jurisdiction because any declaration or injunction
given by the English court would not be enforced in Finland. The court rejected that argument
holding that under the EU system of mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments, there was
no good or conceivable reason that a Finnish court would not recognise and enforce a judgment
from an English court.
Once jurisdictionwas established,Gloster J proceeded to rule that themeasures in questionwere in
danger of breaching Viking Line's rights under EU law and the injunctions sought should thus be
granted.
The court was also asked to make a reference to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.Gloster J declined,
holding that the case was a very fact-dependent case and the area of law in questionwas onewhere
there is much developed jurisprudence already in existence. The court was also concerned that a
reference would result in considerable delay which would be injurious to Viking Line's interests.
Therewas no need thus tomake a reference to the ECJ.
Comment
Jurisdiction
As to the question of jurisdiction and the argument that a Finnish court would not recognise an
injunction granted by the English court, the court held that under Regulation 44/2001, a Member
State is duty bound to recognise and enforce judgments from another Member State unless the
judgmentwas contrary to the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought.The
court added thus that a declaration by one Member State that the proposed industrial action was
illegal under EU law would be recognised by the court of another Member State and that therewas
no conceivable good public policy ground on which a Finnish court would decline to recognise and
enforce it. As Gloster J said:
Refusal and enforcement of such a judgment could therefore not be opposed in Finland on the ground
that the English court hadmisapplied Finnish or Community law in reaching its decision.2
This is an important reiteration or restatement of the principle in Owusu (and also Case C^159/02
Turner v Grovit 3) that jurisdiction establishedunder the Brussels Regulation should notbe given up on
the basis of judicially discretionary grounds, such as comity, bad faith etc. InTurner, co-operation
between Member States is presumed.On that basis, an argument that a Finnish court would reject
an English judgment could not realistically be entertained as being valid by an English court because if
the Finnish court did act contrary to the principle of mutual recognition and enforcement of
judgments, that was a matter for the EUCommission to take upwith the Finnish authorities. It was
not for the English court to anticipate the non-recognition of its judgment by a fellowMember State
tribunalwhere its own jurisdiction has been properly establishedunder the Brussels regime.
1 [2005] 2 WLR 942. See analysis (2005)11 JIML182.
2 See para 80 of the judgment.
3 27 April 2004, ECJ.
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Freedom of establishment
Article 43, EC provides:
Within the frameworkof the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of
nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such
prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches, or subsidiaries by
nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State. Freedom of
establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to
set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second
paragraph of Article 48, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the
country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the chapter relating to
capital.
It is obvious that Viking possessed the right to establish itself in anyMember State by reflagging, free
from any impedimentwhich couldnotbe justifiedunder theTreatyexceptions toArticle 43.However
it was arguedby ITF that they had no control over the shipping register in Estonia and as such, could
not be said to prevent the reflagging of the Rosella. The FSU's contention was that they were only
taking industrial action to protect employees' rights, not against the reflagging of the Rosella. The
judge rejected these arguments, quite rightly, on the basis that the ITF had defined their industrial
action measures too narrowly. It was obvious the Viking Line would be very seriously affected by
the unions' threatened actions if it proceeded with the reflagging. Additionally, from documentary
evidence, it was clear that the ITF was wholly committed to fighting the reflagging. As far as EU law
is concerned, it is clear that any measure which is liable to hamper or to render less attractive the
exercise by a national of a Member State of the freedom of establishment, is an obstacle to that
fundamental freedom guaranteed by theTreaty.4 Any measure which places an additional financial
burden on a person so as to make the exercise of a freemovement rightmore difficult constitutes a
restriction on that freemovement right.5
It should also benoted that as far back asCaseC^221/89 Factortame,6 it has been the law thatwhere
a vessel is used as `an instrument for pursuing an economic activity which involves a fixed
establishment in the Member State concerned, the registration of that vessel cannot be dissociated
from the exercise of the freedom of establishment'.7 Thus, in the present case, it could notbe argued
that there was no threat to Viking Line's freedom of establishment because industrial action was
directed not at the general activities of the company, only one specific vessel.Consequently, it could
also not be suggested that the company's right to establish in Estonia as a subsidiary or other
corporate structures was not impeded.
It is conventional law that the freedom of establishment right is one owedby a Member State to the
enterprise or undertaking.The question herewas, however, whether thatwas a rightowed toViking
by ITF and FSU, which are clearly not emanations of the state.This is perhaps the more interesting
question ^ and onewhich, perhaps, the court should havemade a reference to the ECJ.Be that as it
may, it was held that therewas horizontal direct effect in Article 43.Thatmeans a private entity can
claim those rights against another private entity.The court accepted Viking's argument that the ECJ
establishes that the freemovement rules apply not only to the action of public authorities but also to
r`ules of any other nature aimed at regulating gainful employment in a collectivemanner'.8 Indeed, in
4 Case C^55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procurati di Milano [1995] ECR I^4165 para 37; Case 249/81
Commission v Ireland [1982] ECR 4005 paras1^3, 21^28.
5 See, in particular,Case C^272/94Michel Guiot [1996] ECR I^1905 and Case C^435/00 GehaNaftiliaki EPE & Others v NPDDLimeniko
Tamio Dodekanisou (14 November 2002) OJ C323/17.
6 [1991] ECR I^3905.
7 ibid paras19^23.
8 CaseC^415/93Union Royale Belge des Socie¨te¨ de Football Association ASBL&Othersv Jean-Marc Bosman&Others [1995] ECR I^4921as
applied in Case C^309/99Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR II^2823.
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Wouters,9 the ECJ, in ruling that Article 43 could extend to professional rules imposed by the
Netherlands Bar Council to lawyers, despite the fact that those rules are not public in nature, held
that those rules were obviously designed to regulate, collectively, self-employment and the provision
of services. Article 43 should not be defeated simply by the contention that associations or
organisations which imposed restrictive and/or discriminatorymeasures are not governed by public
law.Gloster J was persuadedby the argument that the ITF'smeasures, appliedby the ITF and invoked
by the FSU, constituted a set of r`ules' enforced by sanctions.The court also gave some emphasis to
the fact that the FSU actually performed a quasi-public function in regulating employment terms and
conditions in accordancewith Finnish legislation.
This approach seems consistent with the wider legislative aim of Article 43 to enable corporate
entities established in one Member State to establish themselves in another Member State without
being hindered by non-governmental measures which have a significant and considerable influence
over the industrial sector or profession in question. ECJ case law has extended the proscription in
Article 43 to sporting associations and professional bodies and there seems to be no good reason to
exclude trade unions from the remit of Article 43, especially in the maritime sector where trade
unions wield so much power on the employment of workers which is central to the right of
establishment formaritime undertakings.
It was also contended by Viking that, as Article 39 (on free movement of workers) has horizontal
direct effect,10 and the aims of Article 39 are similar to those of Article 43, there was no
justification for treating Article 43 as not having same horizontal effect.Gloster J accepted that
argument. That said, it might be submitted that although the two articles promoted and pursued
the same single market objectives, those objectives are expressed in a general way. Indeed, most of
the freemovement provisions in theTreaty promoted the same convergence objectives of the single
market. Nevertheless, it must be said that this was a supplemental argument to the central thesis
that trade unions, by and large, have immense powers to control the labour market, thereby
affecting the freedom of establishment and as such, should be subject to free movement provisions
of the Treaty. Strong non-governmental bodies such as trade unions, sporting associations,
professional bodies and trade associations, should not be allowed to claim the freemovement rights
without being subject the duties implicit in those rules.
Finally, as regards the issue as towhether themeasures taken by the unionswere discriminatory, the
court was convinced from the evidence that they were intended to protect Finnish jobs. Such
protective measures were intended to prevent the ship from being reflagged to take on Estonian
crew.They were therefore discriminatory. It might be noted that had the measures been to protect
Finnish jobs on Finnish vessels and to pressure foreign vessels to improve the terms and conditions of
their foreign crew, they would not have been discriminatory.This issue of discriminationmaymake it
difficult for trade unions acting in their members' interests not also to be found to be acting in a
discriminatorymanner.The crucial lesson for trade unions is that a measure taken to protect jobs in
one country should not impede the right of the company to relocate to another Member State.
9 ibid.
10 Meaning that the right of free movement of workers was enforceable by a private individual against another private individual
(C^281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR I^4139).
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